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Credit Insurance: Beauty or Beast?
Credit insurance on consumer loans is big busi-
ness in the United States. In 1985, nearly 70 mil-
lion credit life insurance policies with coverage
of almost $200 billion were insuring individual
borrowers against default on car loans, personal
loans, and other extensions of consumer credit.
Some form of credit insurance covered approx-
imately 70 percent of all closed-end (non-
revolving) consumer loans made in 1985.
Given such figures, it is tempting to conclude
that credit insurance is well-understood and
highly desired by the borrowing public- a
view frequently expressed by credit insurance
underwriters and the lenders who sell such
insurance. Critics ofthe credit insurance indus-
try, however, have long argued that much ofthe
"popularity" of credit insurance is due to other
factors, including borrower ignorance of alterna-
tives to credit insurance and coercive practices
by lenders.
Such sharply divergent views have created
intense debate over credit insurance. This Letter
examines some long-standing consumer issues
surrounding the credit insurance product. The
analysis concludes that credit insurance often
can fulfill the legitimate needs of borrowers at a
reasonable cost, although premium rates in
some states may be excessive. Also, borrowers
should carefully assess their need for this prod-
uct, be aware of potentially abusive sales prac-
tices, and recognize their legal rights to refuse
the purchase of credit insurance or to seek it
from an alternate source.
Purpose of credit insurance
Credit insurance is sold to borrowers in connec-
tion with the extension of consumer credit by a
lender, usually a financial institution or retailer.
It is designed to ensure the repayment of a bor-
rower's debt in the event ofdeath, disability, or
loss of property. Lenders typically purchase
credit insurance from underwriters on a group
basis. The lender holds the policy and issues a
certificate of insurance to the borrower. The
lender is named beneficiary and directly
receives any payments made on submitted
claims.
There are three basic types of credit insurance:
credit life, credit accident and health (A&H), and
credit property insurance. Credit life insurance,
which may be bought as single or joint coverage
(typically, spouses), is the most commonly pur-
chased type ofcredit insurance and provides for
loan repayment in the event of the borrower's
death. It is normallywritten as declining term
insurance in which coverage decreases as the
loan is repaid.
A&H insurance is designed to repay a bor-
rower's debt during any period in which a bor-
rower suffers a loss of income due to illness or
injury. A&H policies often feature a "retroac-
tive" clause that requires a borrower to be dis-
abled for a specified time period (usually from
seven to thirty days) before insurance payments
begin. A&H insurance entails greater risk of loss
to the underwriter and is more difficult to
administer (e.g., more'than one claim may be
filed).
Credit property insurance is a third type of credit
insurance and insures property purchased with
the proceeds of a borrower's loan or property
used as collateral for a loan. Credit property
insurance, like credit life and A&H, is underwrit-
ten by several types of firms: specialty com-
panies that engage more or less exclusively in
credit insurance, full-line insurance companies,
and "captive" insurance companies - those
owned by a single lender or group of lenders.
Advantages and disadvantages
In addition to providing debt default protection,
credit insurance (particularly credit life insur-
ance) has characteristics that distinguish it from
other types of insurance and may provide impor-
tant advantages to some individuals. Unlike reg-
ular life insurance, it is conveniently sold
through creditors and can be made available in
very small amounts ofcoverage. The premium
rate is constant and does not depend on, the sizeFABSF
and term ofthe loan or the insured's health or
age (although it is usually not made available to
borrowers over 65). Generally, no proof of insur-
ability is required, and credit insurance cannot
be cancelled.
Critics of credit insurance, however, argue
mainly that its cost is excessive and that its sale
has been characterized by abusive practices,
particularly coercion.
Excessivecost?
The issue of "excessive" cost remains open to
debate. Lenders argue that premium rates for
credit insurance reflect the relatively high pro-
cessing and administrative costs associated with
policies of a small average size. They also argue
that credit insurance is subject to an "adverse
selection" process in which insured persons of
disparate ages and health conditions pay identi-
cal premium rates - a practice not found in
most other types of insurance in which pre-
miums more directly reflect risk. Nevertheless,
available evidence suggests that credit insurance
rates in some states are higher than needed to
cover the sum of claims, reasonable lender com-
pensation, and normal profits to insurance
underwriters.
Since states regulate credit insurance rates,
much ofthe controversy has focused on their
rate-setting practices. Those who blame states
for causing high rates therefore suggest that the
solutions, such as competitive rate bidding or
the elimination of separate charges for credit
insurance, also lie with the states.
Currently, most states establish prima faciemax-
imum rates (quoted in cents per hundreddollars
of insurance) at levels designed to generate
some targeted "loss ratio" (the ratio of premiums
paid to premiums collected). Many states have
adopted a target loss ratio of 60percent, a figure
recommended by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. Maximum rates and
actual loss ratios vary widely, however. Some
states (e.g., Alabama, Louisiana, and South Car-
olina) permit creditors to charge up to $1.00 per
hundred of credit life insurance. Others set max-
imum rates at much lower levels: California at
$.40; Maine, $040; NewJersey, $.39; and New
York $.28.
These differences are not trivial, especially in
view of the small differences in the state-to-state
cost of providing credit insurance. In Alabama,
the premium for credit life insurance (including
interest charges on the financing ofthe insur-
ance premium) for a $6,000, 48-month loan at a
15 percent annual percentage rate would be
approximately $340. In New York, premiums for
the same coverage would be about $80.
Since credit insurance is readily obtainable in all
states despite widely varying premium rates,
maximum rates in many states probably could
be lowered without reducing the availability of
credit insurance. Although lenders and insurers
argue to the contrary, past experiences do not
seem to support them. Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, recently required some creditors to obtain
three competitive bids when choosing a credit
insurance underwriter. As a result, credit insur-
ance rates charged by lenders affected by this
regulation declined about 50 percent from the
state maximum of $.50 to approximately $.28
with no observable decrease in insurance avail-
ability. A similar experience was recorded in
Canada in 1976 when maximum rates were
reduced from approximately $.65 to $.35.
Those who believe the cost of credit insurance is
excessive point to the sale of credit insurance at
the maximum allowable rate in most states. This
practice occurs for two reasons. First, lenders are
generally prohibited from charging more for
credit insurance than they themselves pay. Sec-
ond, lenders are typically compensated for
credit insurance sales through a portion ofthe
collected premiums (up to 60 percent in some
states). Thus, lenders as well as insurers profit
from charging higher premiums.
A lender's ability to charge borrowers the max-
imum allowable premium rate may be abetted
bythe public's unfamiliarity with the alternatives
to credit insurance and, to some degree, by the
public's insensitivity to the cost when it is com-
bined with monthly loan payments. When
priced as a lump sum, the total cost of credit
insurance may be apparent. But when financed
with a loan (as it usually is), the increase to the
monthly loan payment is commonly only a mat-
ter of several dollars or less. Thus, many bor-
rowers may be insensitive to the cost of lender-provided credit insurance - particularly in view
ofwhat they may perceive to be the high cost of
searching for alternative sources ofcredit insur-
ance.
Abusive sales practices?
Many borrowers voluntarily purchase lender-
provided credit insurance as a matter of conve-
nience and out of a desire to minimize search
costs. Others, critics argue, are explicitly (and
illegally) pressured into buying the lender's
credit insurance as a condition for receiving
credit. (In certain states it is legal for a creditor to
require borrowers to obtain credit insurance.
Federal laws, however, prohibit lenders from
specifying that it be purchased from a particular
source. Moreover, whenever credit insurance is
required/the "Truth-in"Lending" Act mandates
that its cost be included in the annual percent-
age rate quoted for the loan.)
The issue of tie-in sales of credit insurance has
serious implications given the importance ofthe
function of granting credit in our economy.
Seller coercion, however,may be subtle or
explicit and is difficult to measure. As a result,
its extent has always been a matter of debate.
A 1985 Federal Reserve-sponsored survey
provides some support for the view that tie-ins
are not perceived by borrowers as an important
problem. The survey revealed that 65 percent of
consumer loans studied were covered by credit
insurance, 90 percent ofwhich was purchased
from the lender. Although 20 percent of bor-
rowers who purchased credit insurance said it
was either "required" or "strongly recom-
mended," only 4 percent of borrowers felt that
their decision to purchase credit insurance made
a difference in the lender's decision to grant the
loan. In addition, 90 percent of borrowers who
purchased credit insurance thought that credit
insurance was a "good" idea, and 95 percent
were inclined to purchase it again.
Conclusion
This Letter has examined certain consumer
issues related to credit insurance while leaving
the question as to whether borrowers should
purchase credit insurance in specific instances
unanswered. For many borrowers credit insur-
ance can conveniently fulfill a legitimate need
for protection against loan default- and at a
reasonable price in many states. For others, it
may represent a costly and needless "extra."
Borrowers need to assess their overall financial
status when considering the purchase of credit
insurance. Ifa borrower has sufficient regular
life insurance or assets with which to repay
existing loans in the event of death or disability,
credit insurance may be a poor purchase. In
addition, credit insurance is less advantageously
priced for younger borrowers who can usually
add coverage to an existing term life policy at
less expense. For older borrowers, or for bor-
rowers who cannot afford or medically qualify
for regular life insurance, however, credit insur-
ance may be more worthwhile.
Borrowers should always compare the credit
insurance rate being charged withtheir state's
maximum allowable rate. A borrower should
also be aware of the benefits and qualifying
provisions of his credit insurance policy and of
his right to refuse a particular lender's credit
insurance in favor of other sources.
A 1985 survey of borrower attitudes toward
credit insurance provides evidence that bor-
rowers do not view coercion to buy credit insur-
ance to be an important problem. Efforts on the
part ofthe credit insurance industry and insur-
ance regulators to eliminate past alleged abuses
continue to improve the insurance product
provided borrowers. Nevertheless, individual
borrowers still should carefully assess their own
need for credit insurance.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investmentsl 2 203,714 2,256 6,782 3.4
Loans and Leases1 6 183,579 1,588 5,865 3.3
Commercial and Industrial 51,008 791 - 106 - 0.2
Real estate 67,437 112 2,798 4.3
Loans to Individuals 39,543 79 1,721 4.5
Leases 5,635 101 231 4.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,921 625 - 86 - 0.7
OtherSecurities2 8,214 43 1,003 13.9
Total Deposits 207,802 802 8,958 4.5
Demand Deposits 52,744 24 5,622 11.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,656 - 196 - 6,383 -14.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 17,486 - 112 3,528 25.2
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,573 891 - 190 - 0.1
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 47,094 - 63 1,981 4.3
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 34,824 553 - 3,484 - 9.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,619 2,157 2,506 10.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change